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Summary
The NORA rapid risk assessment tool was developed for situations where there is a
change in the disease status of easily transmissible animal diseases in neighbouring
countries or in countries with significant interactions with Finland. The goal was to
develop a tool that is quick to use and will provide consistent results to support risk
management decisions. The model contains 63 questions that define the potential
for entry and exposure by nine different pathways. The magnitude of the conse-
quences is defined by 23 statements. The weight of different pathways is defined
according to the properties of the assessed disease. The model was built as an Excel
spreadsheet and is intended for use by animal health control administrators. As an
outcome, the model gives the possible pathways of disease entry into the country,
an overall approximation for the probability of entry and the subsequent exposure,
an overall estimate for the consequences and a combined overall risk estimate
(probability multiplied by magnitude of consequences). Model validity was assessed
by expert panels. Outside Africa, African swine fever is currently established in Rus-
sia and Sardinia. In addition, there have been cases in both wild boar and domestic
pigs in Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Estonia. Finland has frequent contacts with
Russia and Estonia, especially through passengers. The risk of African swine fever
(ASF) introduction into Finland was tested with NORA for the situation in Decem-
ber 2015, when ASF was endemic in many parts of Russia, Africa and Sardinia and
was present in Baltic countries and in Poland. African swine fever was assessed to
have a high probability of entry into Finland, with high consequences and therefore
a high overall risk.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Risk assessment can be either quantitative or qualitative, with both
types being equally valid (Dufour et al., 2011). Risk assessment is a
good method to aid risk managers, for example with questions of
emerging risks. However, the downside is often the time require-
ment of the method. There is often a need for information “as soon
as possible”, but the scientific quantitative risk assessment procedure
may take months or even years. Therefore, various qualitative or
semiquantitative methods have been developed to address risk ques-
tions in a matter of days. According to Wilson and Crouch (2001),
risk can be defined as a combination of the probability of an adverse
event occurring and the severity of the occurrence, giving:
Risk = Probability 9 Severity.
Received: 22 April 2016
DOI: 10.1111/tbed.12633
Transbound Emerg Dis. 2017;64:2113–2125. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/tbed © 2017 Blackwell Verlag GmbH | 2113
Rapid risk assessments are normally used when there is a need
for a rapid and rough estimate of a risk shortly after it emerges to
allow urgent risk management actions. Compared to a thorough sci-
entific risk assessment, rapid risk assessment tools are less reliable
and less accurate. There is often a need for expert panels instead of
scientific evidence. Rapid risk assessments can be complex and
demanding due to the tight time schedule and limited information
available in rapidly changing situations.
The questions relating to the risk are answered and added
together to gain an overall value, which is then usually converted to
a four- to nine-level verbal scale (Dufour et al., 2011; Moutou,
Dufour, & Ivanov, 2001). The EFSA scientific opinion on risk assess-
ment terminology (EFSA, 2012) provides an overview of categories
used for different levels of risk. Words used for categories vary and,
e.g., Mur, Martınez-Lopez, and Sanchez-Vizcaıno (2012) used a six-
level scale (negligible, very low, low, medium, high and very high)
when assessing the risk of African swine fever introduction into the
EU through transport-associated routes. Rapid risk assessment tools
are normally based on a flow chart (Morgan, Kirkbride, Hewitt, Said,
& Walsh, 2009; Palmer, Brown, & Morgan, 2005) or a risk matrix
(ECDC, 2011). A flow chart is a structured way to attain an end
point by answering a series of linked questions, while a matrix is a
way of combining two categorized qualitative estimates (e.g., proba-
bility and consequence). Defra’s International Disease Monitoring
Veterinary Science Team has developed a tool to give a rapid semi-
quantitative measure of the risk of disease introduction (Roberts,
Carbon, Hartley, & Sabirovic, 2011). It uses a decision matrix based
on the hypothesis that a disease could be introduced into the UK
through trade (legal and illegal) in live animals or animal products, via
transport and fomites or through the movement of vectors or wild-
life.
Morgan et al. (2009) developed a rapid, systematic, objective and
transparent method for assessing the risk to the UK population from
new and emerging infections arising anywhere in the world. They
assumed the method to provide a means of communicating risk in a
systematic manner to stakeholders and to provide an audit trail for
the decisions made. The method was based on two flow charts, one
for the probability and one for the impact of the risk. They published
both the probability and impact of Chikungunya as being minimal
when assessed with their tool. However, their tool did not combine
the probability and impact.
The evaluation of risk assessment based on systematic documen-
tation provides an important means of identifying where improve-
ments can be made, as well as an evidence base for future risk
assessments and responses to events (WHO, 2012). According to
WHO (2012), rapid risk management of acute public health events
reduces or prevents disease in affected populations and reduces
negative social and economic consequences. Additional benefits are
defensible decision-making, the implementation of appropriate and
timely control measures, more effective operational communication,
more effective risk communication and improved preparedness.
The reason for us to develop a specific tool for Finland is based
on the special nature of our country: the risks are different from
those in the majority of other EU countries. We are free from many
common diseases, our country is isolated in many ways, the trade in
animals is minimal, and native data are readily available.
African swine fever (ASF) is endemic in sub-Saharan Africa,
Madagascar, and since 1978 also in Sardinia (EFSA AHAW Panel,
2010; Sanchez-Vizcaıno, Mur, & Martınez-Lopez, 2013). More
recently, African swine fever virus (ASFV) was introduced in Georgia
in 2007, probably through the feeding of pigs with imported infected
meat products or garbage. Since then, ASFV has spread markedly in
the Caucasus area (Georgia, the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Ukraine and Belarus), causing many outbreaks in domestic
backyard or industrially kept pigs and/or wild boar populations (EFSA
AHAW Panel, 2010, 2014; Gogin, Gerasimov, Malogolovkin, & Kol-
basov, 2013; Sanchez-Vizcaıno et al., 2013). The situation substan-
tially worsened when the disease entered the European Union in the
Baltic countries at the end of 2013–early 2014. Several outbreaks
within Lithuania and Poland were reported to OIE (EFSA AHAW
Panel, 2014). The genotype currently causing outbreaks in Lithuania,
Poland and also very widely in Estonia and Latvia (OIE, 2016;
Sanchez-Vizcaıno, Mur, Gomez-Villamandos, & Carrasco, 2015;
Sanchez-Vizcaıno, Mur, Sanchez-Matamoros, & Martınez-Lopez,
2014) is highly virulent (FAO, 2013; Gogin et al., 2013). Recently,
several ASF risk assessments on European level have been con-
ducted and those have used a qualitative approach (EFSA AHAW
Panel 2010, 2014; FAO, 2013), semiquantitative tools (De la Torre
et al., 2013; Mur et al., 2012) or quantitative models (Mur et al.,
2012).
Our aim was to develop a rapid, systematic and transparent risk
assessment method to assess the risk of animal diseases spreading
into Finland and to use it for ASF assessment, as the disease has
spread alarmingly in Russia and in the Baltic countries.
2 | MATERIALS AND METHODS
NORA was built as an Excel spreadsheet, and its use does not
require advanced computer skills. The method used is principally
based on the risk assessment method developed by the World Orga-
nization for Animal Health (OIE) (2011).
This method runs through three different steps: (i) release and
exposure, (ii) consequences and (iii) overall risk estimation. The first
step, release and exposure assessment, is an estimation of the likeli-
hood of a hazard being introduced into Finland and a susceptible
animal becoming exposed to the hazard. This can be referred to as
the probability of occurrence. Secondly, consequences are assessed,
including economic and health consequences. The third step is risk
estimation, which combines the results of the two preceding steps.
2.1 | Identification of relevant pathways
Nine different pathways have been identified for the entry and
release of a disease: with live animals (i), sperm and embryos (ii),
products of animal origin (iii), passengers (iv), wildlife (v), air currents
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and/or vectors (vi), animal transport vehicles (vii), feed and bedding
materials (viii) and other goods and traffic (ix) (Figure 1).
There are two sets of questions for each pathway. Every ques-
tion comes with guidance on things to consider when answering.
Also, many multiple choice answers come with definitions of choices.
The first set of questions defines the possibility of a pathway for the
scenario in question (Table 1). If the pathway is relevant, the other
set of questions defines the probability of that pathway in the sce-
nario (Table 2). If the pathway is not relevant, one moves on to the
questions of the following pathway. These pathways are only rele-
vant if the entry of the disease can be followed by the exposure of
a susceptible animal.
2.2 | Probabilities of pathways
The probability of a pathway is a product of the questions defining
the possibility and the magnitude of certain actions that are risk
related. The magnitude questions scale the likelihood of an event by
means of multiple choice (three choices). The answers may either
decrease or increase the risk. The risk may be increased if the
answer is “yes” to a risk-increasing question such as: “Has there
been import of animals from the area known to be infected during
the past year?” An example of a risk-decreasing question is the
following: “Is adequate import quarantine in use?”
The questions concerning probabilities are given a point estimate
between 0 and 1. Pathways may be made up of more than one
entity. The estimates for the questions regarding the same pathway
are then multiplied with each other within an entity of questions.
The multiplied scores of entities are added together and divided by
the number of entities. An example of an entity is the import of live
animals, and another is the smuggling of live animals in the pathway
“with live animals”.
2.3 | Combining the probabilities of the pathways
NORA includes different weights for entry pathways (Table 3) and
for the subfactors of consequences (Table 5). Different pathogens
transmit in different ways; e.g., some pathogens can spread only
through direct contact and some may spread with, e.g., air current
and vectors. Therefore, the entry pathways need to be weighted
depending on the transmission properties of the pathogen. There are
three different weighting alternatives in NORA depending on the
transmission of the disease. One is for easily transmitted viral dis-
eases that can also be transmitted via animal products (African swine
fever and classical swine fever), one is for easily transmitted viral dis-
eases with an airborne transmission feature (Bluetongue), and one is
for diseases with both properties (foot-and-mouth disease). The
weighting factors were assigned as follows: firstly, the nine different
pathways were ranked so that the pathways with the same signifi-
cance were given the same rank. Then, 100 points were divided
between the pathways according to their ranks. The probabilities of
different pathways are added together and then divided by the total
weights for the pathways (i.e., 100).
2.4 | Defining the consequences of a disease
The list of statements for the consequences of a hazard (Table 4)
follows the questions for the pathways of entry. These are yes/no
F IGURE 1 Possible pathways for
the entry of diseases into Finland.
[Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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questions, and they can only increase the risk estimate for conse-
quences. Statements for the value of the animal sector define how
many species of animals the disease in question is capable of affect-
ing. The foodstuff values of the affected sectors are combined. Ani-
mal species taken into account in NORA are: cattle, poultry, pigs,
cultivated fish, deer, reindeer, wild fish, hares, sheep and wild fowl.
The second set of statements defines the disease’s classification
in the national legislation. Diseases are divided according to their
importance for the national economy, which thus defines the impor-
tance of their control.
The third set of statements concerns the multiplier effects of dis-
ease introduction. The classification of the disease, the multiplier
effects of its entry and the menace of the disease together form an
additive entity called the severity of the disease.
The weighting factors for the consequences are the same for all the
assessed diseases (Table 5). The highest factor is for the impact on the
TABLE 1 Questions defining whether a pathway is relevant
1. With live animals
Is it possible for the disease to spread with live animals?
Is there import of live animals from the country(ies) in question?
Is it possible for these imported animals to come into contact with susceptible animals?
2. With sperm and embryos
Is it possible for the disease to spread with gametes?
Is there import of gametes from the country(ies) in question?
Is it possible for these imported gametes to end up in contact with susceptible animals?
3. With products of animal origin
Is it possible for the disease to spread with products of animal origin?
Is there import of products of animal origin that may spread the disease from the country(ies) in question?
Is it possible for farmers or farm workers to bring these products with them?
Is it possible for the pathogen in these products to be carried with people to susceptible animals in Finland?
4. With passengers
Is it possible for the disease to be spread with humans?
Is it possible for a traveller in the country(ies) in question to have been in contact with infected animals or materials?
Is it possible for a person who has been in an animal facility in the country(ies) in question to come into contact with susceptible animals in
Finland?
Is it possible for this person to enter an animal facility in Finland within the infectious period?
5. With wildlife
Is it possible for the disease to infect wildlife?
Is it possible for infected wildlife to migrate to Finland?
Is it possible for infected wildlife or their secretions to come into contact with susceptible animals in Finland?
6. With air currents and/or vectors
Is it possible for the disease to spread with air currents or vectors?
Is it possible for the disease to be transmitted to Finland with air currents or vectors?
Is the climate currently suitable for spread with air currents or vectors?
Is it possible at the moment for disease spread with air currents or vectors to come into contact with susceptible animals in Finland?
7. With animal transport vehicles
Is it possible for the disease to spread with an animal transport vehicle?
Are there animal transport vehicles coming to Finland from the country(ies) in question?
Is it possible for an animal transport vehicle to come into contact with susceptible animals in Finland while infectious?
8. With feed or bedding materials
Is it possible for the disease to spread with feed or bedding materials?
Is there import of animal feed or bedding materials from the country(ies) in question?
Is it possible for the feed or bedding materials to come into contact with susceptible animals in Finland while infectious?
9. With other goods or traffic
Is it possible for the disease to spread with other goods and traffic?
Are other goods or land traffic coming from the country(ies) in question?
Is it possible for these goods or traffic to come into contact with susceptible animals in Finland while infectious?
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export of foodstuffs, the second highest is for the classification in the
legislation, the third is for other multiplier effects, the fourth is for the
menace and zoonotic features of the disease with identical weights, and
the smallest factor is for the economic value of the animal sector(s)
affected. These weighting factors rely on the fact that NORA is
constructed for use in the administration of animal health control.
The consequences of the hazard are counted accordingly: the
summed animal sector values are multiplied by the first
three multiplier effects and added to the last multiplier effect (“the
disease-free status is lost and its restoration demands significant
resources”) and to the disease classification in the legislation, menace
and the possible zoonotic nature of the disease.
TABLE 2 Questions defining the probability of a pathway
1. With live animals
How many batches of animals have been imported during the past year from the country(ies) in question?
Has there been import of animals from the area known to be infected during the past year?
Is the health status of the importing farm(s) known and acceptable?
Is the health status of the imported animals known and acceptable?
Is adequate import quarantine in use?
Is it possible that the smuggling of live animals from the country(ies) in question is significant?
Is it known that a significant number of sensitive animals have been imported against the rules from the country(ies) in question?
2. With gametes
How many batches of gametes have been imported from the country(ies) in question during the past year?
Has there been import of gametes from the area known to be infected during the past year?
Is the health status of the importing farm(s) known and acceptable?
Is the health status of the imported gametes known and acceptable?
Is it possible that the smuggling of gametes from the country(ies) in question is significant?
Is it known that a significant quantity of gametes has been imported against the rules from the country(ies) in question?
3. With products of animal origin
Is it possible that products of animal origin from the infected areas are brought for sale in Finland?
How large a quantity of products of animal origin from the country(ies) in question is sold in Finland?
How many of these products remain infective until in possession of the end user?
How many passengers come from the country(ies) in question?
How many citizens of the country(ies) in question work on Finnish farms?
Is it possible that the smuggling of products of animal origin from the country(ies) in question is significant?
Is it known that a significant quantity of products of animal origin has been imported against the rules from the country(ies) in question?
4. With passengers
Do the professionals working with animals (shearers, veterinarians, advisors) in the country(ies) in question come to Finland?
How many citizens of the country(ies) in question work on farms in Finland?
How many passengers come from the country(ies) in question?
5. With wildlife
How much wildlife can migrate to Finland while infectious from the country(ies) in question?
How much are the wild animals in contact with sensitive animals in Finland?
6. With air currents and/or vectors
How far is the infected area from the Finnish border?
How many sensitive animals are there in the area where the pathogen may end up in Finland?
7. With animal transport vehicles
How long may the pathogen remain infectious outside an animal?
How many infectious animal transport vehicles come from the infected area to Finland?
8. With feed or bedding materials
How long may the pathogen remain infectious outside an animal?
How many batches of feed or bedding materials have come to Finland from the infected area during the past year?
9. With other goods or traffic
How long may the pathogen remain infectious outside an animal?
How large a quantity of infectious other goods or traffic has come to Finland during the past year?
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2.5 | Combining probability and consequences
The estimate for probability is multiplied by the estimate for the
consequences to calculate the total risk score. The probability and
magnitude of the consequences and the total scores can then be
transformed into a five-level categorical scale: negligible, low, moder-
ate, high or very high risk (Tables 6, 7 and 8). The verbal scores are
explained in Table 9.
The equation for the combined overall risk:
2.6 | Validation of the tool
We first conducted a preliminary review of rapid risk assessment
tools in May 2012, followed by a questionnaire to the five experts
in charge of animal health issues at the Finnish Food Safety Author-
ity Evira and two experts in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.
The replies to the questionnaire were discussed in a meeting in
November 2012. In August 2013, a follow-up meeting was held with
the five experts from Evira and another meeting with three experts
in January 2014.
Initially, risk assessments for ASF introduction were performed
with NORA by the research group. Later on, expert elicitation groups
were formed to validate the questions concerning probabilities of
pathways for ASF introduction. The first was a preliminary test with
four experts at Evira that took place in June–July 2015. Three work-
shops were then held for experts in December 2015: one for veteri-
narians specializing in transmissible animal diseases (five persons),
one for postgraduates in veterinary medicine (nine persons) and the
final one for experts of animal health risk management at Evira (five
persons). In February 2016, we conducted one more workshop for
risk assessors at Evira (12 persons) working with plant health- and
food-related risks.
The four validation groups (veterinarians specializing in transmis-
sible animal diseases, postgraduates in veterinary medicine, experts
of animal health risk management at Evira and risk assessors at Evira
working with plant health- and food-related risks) answered the
questions concerning the pathways (Identification of relevant path-
ways, Table 1) and their probabilities (Probabilities of pathways,
Table 2). Weights of pathways (Table 3), weights for different conse-
quence factors (Table 5) and the answers regarding the list of state-
ments for the consequences of a disease (Table 4) were given by
the research group and not changed by the validation groups. The
results for overall pathways probabilities are presented separately
for each validation group and also as a mean across all the validation
groups.
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Probability of the risk
The outcomes of the validation groups were mostly consistent: all
groups (but not all individuals) assessed all the routes of entry and
exposure to be relevant, except for air currents and/or vectors (Fig-
ure 1). Moreover, they evaluated the probability of African swine
fever being released into the Finnish pig population to be high (0.18
and 0.16) or very high (0.21 and 0.23), respectively, with the mean
Sum of pathway probabilities
maximum score for the pathways
 

ðValue of the affected animal sectors ðImpact on the export of foodstuffs
þ Loss of a disease-free status followed by competition with imported foodstuff
þ Loss of a disease-free status followed by an increased disease riskÞÞ
þ Classification in the legislationþ Loss of disease-free status and its restoration will require considerable resources
þMenace of the diseaseþ Zoonotic nature
maximum score for the impact
 100:
0
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
TABLE 3 Weights for different entry and exposure pathways for
African swine fever (ASF), classical swine fever (CSF), Bluetongue
(BT) and foot-and-mouth disease (FMD)
Weighting factors for the
probability of the pathways ASF, CSF BT FMD
With animals 30 35 30
With sperm and embryos 15 17 13
With animal products 15 0 13
With passengers 5 0 4
With wildlife 15 12 13
With air currents and/or vectors 0 30 13
With animal transport vehicles 10 6 6
With feed or bedding 5 0 4
With other goods or traffic 5 0 4
Sum 100 100 100
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being high (0.195) (Figure 2, Table 6). To study the differences
between the groups, we examined the mean ranks of probabilities
with the Kruskal–Wallis test, because the estimates within the
groups were not normally distributed and the numbers of respon-
dents per group were low. The Kruskal–Wallis test revealed no sig-
nificant difference (p = .309) between the mean ranks of
probabilities for these groups (Figure 2).
Even though the mean overall probability estimate was quite
similar across the four groups of respondents, the scores for the nine
different pathways varied somewhat (Figure 3). The mean overall
scores (probability 9 weight) across the validation groups were as
follows: the highest score was 6.7 for products of animal origin, 3.6
for live animals and for passengers, 1.8 for feed and bedding materi-
als, 1.2 for other goods and traffic, 1.1 for sperm and embryos and
for animal transport vehicles, and the lowest score 0.45 for wild
boar.
To study the within-group variation in probabilities between the
groups, we examined the mean ranks of residuals with the Kruskal–
Wallis test. The variation differed significantly between the groups
for the following routes: with sperm and embryos (p = .013), with
products of animal origin (p = .035), with passengers (p = .001), with
wildlife (p = .000), with animal transport vehicles (p = .000) and with
other goods and traffic (p = .002). The variation in the overall proba-
bility also differed significantly (p = .013) between the groups.
To determine how many respondents are needed to derive a
solid estimate and as little variation as possible, we simulated the
mean and 95% confidence interval for the 31 respondents in four
groups of respondents with a Monte Carlo simulation model (Fig-
ure 4). The specialists’ estimates varied the least, and those of the
plant health and food safety risk assessors varied the most. There-
fore, the number of respondents needed to provide a solid estimate
strongly depends on the background of the respondent.
3.2 | Consequences of the risk
The consequences of ASF release into Finland (Table 5) were evalu-
ated by the research group to be 17.36 representing a high impact
on the verbal scale (Table 7). We did not evaluate the consequences
in the validation groups, as the consequence claims are straightfor-
ward and do not include personal opinions.
To test the consistency of the tool, four diseases were tested
with NORA for their consequences: Schmallenberg virus,
TABLE 4 List of statements for consequences
Score for
each option
1. Value of the animal sector as a foodstuff
The disease can spread to cattle 69.69
The disease can spread to horses 0.08
The disease can spread to poultry 12.99
The disease can spread to pigs 10.06
The disease can spread to cultivated fish 2.83
The disease can spread to deer 2.62
The disease can spread to reindeer 0.63
The disease can spread to wild fish 0.46
The disease can spread to hares 0.40
The disease can spread to sheep 0.15
The disease can spread to wild fowl 0.08
2. Disease classification in the legislation
Dangerous animal disease 24
Easily transmissible animal disease 32
Controlled animal disease 16
Notifiable animal disease 8
A new disease or form of the disease not
mentioned in the legislation
20
Other animal disease 0
3. There are significant multiplier effects for
the entry of the disease
Significant impact on the export of foodstuffs 50
The disease-free status is lost and the import
of foodstuffs causes additional competition
and significantly endangers domestic production
10
The disease-free status is lost and it raises the
overall disease risk
10
The disease-free status is lost and its restoration
demands significant resources
30
4. Menace of the disease
Public opinion sees the disease as menacing 100
5. Zoonotic nature
The disease is a significant zoonosis
(causes serious symptoms in
people and/or spreads easily within
the human population)
100
TABLE 5 Weights for different consequence factors and indices for ASF
Weighting factors for consequences
Index for ASF
Maximum
index
Animal sector affected 0.1 10.06 9 0.1 = 1.006 10
Disease classification in legislation 67 32 9 67 = 2,144 2,144
Multiplier effect of exposure 1 (export) 100 50 9 100 = 5,000 5,000
Multiplier effects of exposure 2, 3, 4 50 50 9 50 = 2,500 2,500
Menace of the disease 11 0 1,100
Zoonotic feature of the disease 11 0 1,100
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Bluetongue, ASF and FMD. The consequence scores for disease
release and exposure were then compared with the financial losses
following an outbreak of a typical size (Figure 4). The financial losses
(Bluetongue €4.7 M, ASF €10.5 M and FMD €27.7 M) were
retrieved from previously published risk assessments (Lyytik€ainen
et al., 2015). Schmallenberg, being a disease not controlled by the
authorities, was considered to have zero consequences (multiplier
effects, disease classification, menace and the zoonotic nature of the
disease all giving a score of zero), and the financial losses for the
society were assumed to be close to zero euros. However, Schmal-
lenberg as a disease causes losses and social impacts to the produc-
ers that may lead to indirect financial losses for the society. Those
consequences are not considered in NORA, as it is designed for
assessing the risks of concern to the government.
3.3 | Overall risk
The probability of ASF introduction into Finland was assessed as
high (0.196), the consequences were assessed as high (17.36), and
the overall risk estimate was therefore high (3.4) when assessed with
NORA. The results indicate the relative risk in comparison with other
diseases.
4 | DISCUSSION
NORA was developed to assist the animal health authorities with
risk management questions. It appears to be a good tool, corre-
sponding well to the expectations. It provides a rapid estimate for
the risk and is easy to use.
We used routes of ASF entry for the evaluation of disease
spread. Routes were obtained mostly from the earlier risk profile on
possible routes of entry into Finland for African swine fever (Ora-
vainen et al., 2011) except for the air current/vector, feed or bed-
ding materials and other traffic than animal transport vehicles, which
were not considered when conducting the profile. Also, in the profile
we mapped the possible routes and their volumes but we did not
assess the concerning risks. A thorough assessment of the validity of
the tool can only be made if ASF enters Finland. However, any cal-
culated semiquantitative outcome for single or multiple pathogen
risk assessments should be validated through an internal check with
the qualitative information, through external validation against other
approaches and through peer review.
We tested the method by applying four groups with different
areas of expertise who tested the NORA tool with ASF as the
assessed disease. The mean ranks for the overall probability of ASF
entry did not differ between the groups. Thus, the method appears
to give consistent results. However, the members of the research
group are aware of the subjectivity involved in the method.
The results from the expert groups were compared. All routes
except for air currents and/or vectors were assessed to exist by all
four validation groups. These routes pose severe threats to the Fin-
nish pig industry. Estonia and Russia are very important countries
regarding the spread of disease to Finland due to heavy traffic and
large numbers of passengers travelling between the countries. Prod-
ucts of animal origin, including sausages, are common souvenirs from
Estonia and Russia. In addition, there are many Russian, Ukrainian
and Estonian workers on Finnish farms. Finnish hunters have hunted
TABLE 7 Converting the numerical value of the consequences
into a verbal score
Consequence claims
Numerical values Verbal score
<1 Negligible
1–5 Low
5–15 Moderate
15–50 High
50–100 Very high
TABLE 6 Converting the numerical value of the probability into a
verbal score
Probability of the risk
Numerical values Verbal score
<0.01 Negligible
0.01–0.024 Low
0.025–0.049 Moderate
0.05–0.199 High
0.2–1 Very high
TABLE 8 Converting the numerical value of the overall risk into a
verbal score
Overall risk score
Numerical values Verbal score
<0.01 Negligible
0.01–0.249 Low
0.25–2.49 Moderate
2.5–9.99 High
10–100 Very high
TABLE 9 Definitions of the verbal scores for probability and
consequences
Score Probability Consequences
Negligible Rare, needs not to be
considered
Insignificant, need not to be
considered
Low Rare, cannot be ruled out Insignificant, cannot be ruled
out
Moderate Happens sometimes Must be prepared for the
consequences
High Happens often Consequences are serious
Very high Happens almost
always
Consequences are very serious
2120 | KYYR€O ET AL.
wild boars in the Baltic countries for many years and in large
numbers.
The variation between the validation group residuals was signifi-
cantly different for all other transmission routes except two: with
animals and with feed and bedding materials. These might have been
the easiest routes to evaluate, thus leading to a similar level of varia-
tion between the groups. It is easy to understand the effect of direct
transmission with live animals and the low influence on spread posed
by feed and bedding, even without thorough background knowledge
of animal disease transmission. Transmission with air streams and/or
vectors was a non-existent route according to all groups, leading to
zero variation.
The amount of variation within the groups depended on the
background of the group members. The group of veterinarians spe-
cializing in transmissible animal diseases were the most uniform in
their answers. The animal health risk managers were the second
most uniform, and the postgraduates and the risk assessors of food
and plant health varied the most in their answers. Higher numbers
of respondents diminished the confidence interval (variation), sup-
porting the law of large numbers. With larger numbers of respon-
dents in these groups, the variation would have decreased even
more. The explanation for this might be that veterinarians involved
with transmissible diseases hold the most information on the routes
of entry for ASF, thus ending up with similar estimates. The post-
graduates mostly studied companion animals and horses, and the risk
assessors did not work with animal health issues at all.
The NORA scores were 6.7 for products of animal origin (includ-
ing illegal imports), 3.6 for live animals, 1.2 for other goods and traf-
fic, 1.1 for animal transport vehicles and 0.45 for wild boar. The
route for products of animal origin (including illegal imports) has the
highest score in the results, largely because there is a large volume
of passengers between the Baltic countries and Finland. The Baltic
countries and Finland are both part of the Schengen area, and there-
fore, there are no regular border or customs inspections.
The route with live animals, despite having the highest weight in
the model and being the most easily transmitting route, is not as
alarming as might be presumed, as Finland does not trade pigs or pig
sperm with infected countries and Norway is the only country out-
side the EU that Finland imports pigs from. Overall, the level of ani-
mal trade is low. The small number of imported animals and germ
cells as well as the limited volumes of other import pathways makes
the probability of introduction lower than in many other countries,
such as the UK (Defra, 2009).
Along with the official regulations, Finnish farmers follow many
voluntary recommendations, as advised by the national animal health
organization (ETT). The aim of ETT is to hinder transmissible animal
disease introduction through trade and travel. Backyard pigs and
keeping pigs outdoors are very uncommon in Finland. Wild boars
might pose a risk to Finland, but the Finnish wild boar population is
only about 1,500–2,000 animals (Ohto Salo, Finnish Wildlife Agency).
F IGURE 2 Overall probabilities for the entry of African swine
fever estimated by the four validation groups (specialists, n = 5;
experts, n = 5; postgraduates, n = 9; and risk assessors, n = 12). The
interquartile range is the difference between the 75th and 25th
percentiles and corresponds to the length of the box. The lines in
the boxes represent the medians, the whiskers represent the
minimum and maximum, unless there are values more than 1.5 times
the interquartile range above 75th percentile, in which case it is the
third quartile plus 1.5 times the interquartile range. Circles represent
outliers that are >2 box lengths above the 75th percentile
F IGURE 3 Mean scores of entry of
African swine fever estimated by the four
validation groups for the nine pathways:
with animals (1), sperm and embryos (2),
products of animal origin (3), passengers
(4), wildlife (5), air streams and/or vectors
(6), animal transport vehicles (7), feed and
bedding materials (8) and other goods and
traffic (9). [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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The density (less than 0.02 wild boar/km2, FAO, 2010) and move-
ments of wild boar in Russia next to the Finnish border are low
(Oravainen et al. 2011).
Our approach can be compared with several semiquantitative
assessments of the risk of ASF introduction, including results
achieved with the Pandora tool (Roelandt, Van der Stede, Dhondt, &
Koenen, 2015) and assessments by De la Torre et al. (2013), Mur
et al. (2012), Costard et al. (2013) and Bosch et al. (2016). Roelandt
et al. (2017) recently published their semiquantitative Pandora open
source screening protocol with an assessment of the ASF risk to Bel-
gium in early 2014. The results of Pandora and NORA cannot be
compared directly, because they apply to different countries and the
relevancy of pathways may vary. However, the Pandora framework
is basically the same as that of NORA, with emergence and conse-
quence scores that give an overall risk score as their product. Pan-
dora considers entry and exposure separately and then aggregates
them, whereas NORA gives a joint entry and exposure score. Roe-
landt et al. (2017) used European and Belgian experts and found the
averaged emergence risk for ASF to be low, disease consequences
high and the resulting multiplicative overall risk low. In contrast to
this study, the Pandora entry module comprises only one question
and one score. Nonetheless, they assessed that their entry simplifi-
cation has not led to underestimation or overestimation of the risk
of introduction as compared to other approaches from Mur et al.
(2012) Mur et al. (2012) and Costard et al. (2013). Roelandt et al.
(2017) concluded that hunting of wild boar populations, illegal import
of local meat and wild boar movements are important risk factors.
These pathways are also considered in the Finnish NORA model, but
naturally their importance may vary due to geographical and opera-
tional differences between countries.
Mur et al. (2012) assessed the quantitative risk for ASF introduc-
tion into the EU by legal import of live pigs. They showed that legal
trade of live pigs does not pose a high risk for ASFV introduction
into the EU (only one outbreak in 192 years, on average). The
results varied from each other when data from TRACES or EURO-
STAT were used. Finland had a low risk for introduction, when
EUROSTAT was used, taking into account import from Norway, the
only country where pigs were imported from in 2010. Also, after
2010 Norway is the only country, outside the EU, from which pigs
are imported to Finland.
Costard et al. (2013) presented a novel risk assessment frame-
work for disease introduction into the EU through illegal importa-
tion of meat and meat products. They used wild boar suitable
habitat as a proxy, not the number or density of wild boar. Finland
has a lot of suitable habitat but a very low number of wild boar in
the area close to the Russian border. The density of wild boar on
the Russian side of the border is also low (Oravainen et al. 2011).
According to the study of Costard et al. (2013) the herd size was
used to assess the biosecurity level of farms. At that time Finland
still had quite small herds, which despite their small size had high
biosecurity standards (Sahlstr€om, Virtanen, Kyyr€o, & Lyytik€ainen,
2014). Even though low proxys (2/5), these may have led to Finland
having a too high risk score. Costard et al. (2013) stated that the
lack of detailed national data on both wild boar and non-high-biose-
curity farms makes estimation of areas of interface between
F IGURE 4 Effect of the number and
background of experts on the simulated
width of the 95% confidence interval of
the mean value for the overall probability
estimate of entry of African swine fever.
[Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
F IGURE 5 The association between the consequence scores for
Schmallenberg (0), Bluetongue (6.54), ASF (17.36) and FMD (100)
and the costs (€0, €4.7 M, €10.5 M and €27.7 M, respectively) for
an outbreak of a typical size in Finland
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non-high-biosecurity farms and wild boar difficult, and is an impor-
tant limitation of their study.
De la Torre et al. (2013) assessed the risk of African swine fever
introduction into the EU by wild boar and updated the assessment
in 2016 (Bosch et al., 2016). They concluded Finland to have the
highest risk score (risk category 5 in 2013 and 4 in 2016) and that
suitable wild boar habitat and outbreak density in the neighbouring
countries are the two most important risk estimators. They state that
their results help to identify countries where subnational analysis
should be a high priority and that they had a relatively small set of
input data. Indeed, Russia was given only one figure for density of
domestic pig notifications (of ASF), and being such a large country, it
should have been assessed in smaller areas, because those outbreaks
are happening mostly in the southern parts of the country and in
the Tver area. Also, the distance to the nearest wild boar and
domestic pig notifications (for ASF) were given as 114.14 km and
128.03 km for Finland, respectively. Those distances must be from
Estonian outbreaks; however, the Baltic Sea hinders the spread of
the disease between these countries with wild boar.
Unlike the methods of, i.e., ECDC (2011) and Mur et al. (2014)
that work on the European level, NORA was developed for Finnish
risk assessment needs. Mur et al. (2014) assessed the relative release
risk of ASF to 27 EU countries. The relative risk to Finland was
assessed to be 5/5 with wild boar, 4/5 with legal pigs, 3/5 with
transport-associated routes and 2/5 with illegal imports of pig prod-
ucts when each route was compared separately among 27 EU coun-
tries. Our results cannot directly be compared with the results of
Mur et al. (2014), because we have estimated the importance of
these routes for the introduction risk for Finland. Moreover, NORA
considers both release and exposure so the overall risk level should
be lower than when only the release risk is considered. However, a
slight discrepancy can be observed between the results of these two
assessments. NORA considers the wild boar risk to be the least sig-
nificant pathway for introduction to Finland, and Mur et al. (2014)
considers that wild boar release risk to Finland is in the highest cate-
gory within the EU. Also the estimated risk of live pigs might reveal
some discrepancy between studies. Mur et al. (2014) used EU data-
bases and concluded that some of them were not as complete and
detailed as the national databases and that this may have resulted in
under- or overestimations of risk scores. Particularly, information on
wild boar density and backyard pig production was limited and could
have affected the model results. We think that the low number of
wild boar in Finland, the absence of backyard pigs and the fact that
Finland imports pigs from outside EU only from Norway, are actually
facts that if not taken into consideration, may lead to false interpre-
tations and introduce country-related bias into the relative risk esti-
mates of pathways in EU.
Finland was given a very high (5/5) relative risk for ASFV intro-
duction into the EU by waste from international ships and medium
risk (2/5) for waste from international flights. The latter was
described in the earlier risk profile we conducted, along with waste
from the international railways (Oravainen et al., 2011). The model
by Mur et al. (2012) did not provide probabilities, but compared the
relative risk between EU countries based on the risk factors evalu-
ated, i.e., a high value on the model results does not imply an abso-
lute high level of risk. Furthermore, the model estimated only the
risk of release of potential ASFV-contaminated material/transports,
but did not consider the subsequent exposure. The only transport-
associated route included in NORA is the returning trucks. Consider-
ation of risk associated with waste from airplanes and ships could
benefit the NORA tool. However, the inclusion of exposure risk
would reduce the probability of these routes considerably. The prob-
ability of exposure of pigs and wild boar to this waste is low, if it is
handled according to recommendations and good biosecurity prac-
tices are followed. For this reason the present version of NORA
excludes international waste as a potential route to infect animals in
Finland.
Even though national data were available to us for many path-
ways, some pathways needed to be answered without detailed infor-
mation of the volumes (professionals from abroad working with
animals, feed, bedding materials and other goods). Particularly, vol-
ume of illegal import of animals, sperm and products of animal origin
(POAO) are almost impossible to know in detail, even though POAO
were assessed by the number of personal consignments confiscated
during the earlier year. However, national data sources seem to be
more accurate than EU level databases in general.
For easy use of NORA, we wrote a guidebook in Finnish. It
includes a summary, a detailed description of the tool and its mathe-
matical foundations, a quick guide for using NORA and appendices
with background information to be used when answering the NORA
questions. The appendices include the following: the classification of
animal diseases in Finnish legislation, a flow chart for animal disease
release and exposure risk, imports of animals, sperm and embryos,
imports of products of animal origin from third countries, the main
trading partners of Finland, the numbers of passengers from differ-
ent countries, the numbers of foreign workers on Finnish farms and
a list of consulted experts.
The consequences are assessed with yes/no questions that are
unaffected by opinions. Therefore, the consequence section of the
tool was not assessed by the validation groups. The association of
the scores for consequences of the four diseases assessed and the
predicted costs of the disease outbreaks were almost linear, which
indicates that the scores closely approximate the importance of the
disease event. This approach of not using the experts in conse-
quence assessment is different from, for instance, Dufour et al.
(2011). They had scores between zero and three assigned for the
three items considered for animal health and three for human health.
Their four-level scale is a subject for expert assessments.
Estimates for probability, consequences and overall risks in
NORA are obtained both in numbers and as verbal scores. This can
be an asset: some people merely like to see numbers, while others
need to have a verbal score to feel comfortable with the answers.
NORA serves both types of user and enables easy translation
between them. However, one should bear in mind that the same
verbal statement can actually mean a different risk level for different
people. For instance, the level that means an acceptable risk for one
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person might be a level that requires immediate intervention accord-
ing to another. Therefore, definitions of the verbal scores for proba-
bility and impact are included in NORA.
Uncertainty is not built into the NORA framework. It is possible
to estimate it by doing a combination of several point wise estima-
tions, as was carried out when validating the tool in this study. How-
ever, by adding a Monte Carlo simulation option into NORA, it
would be possible to include uncertainty in a more coherent way.
For the practical use of NORA, namely rapid risk assessment, simula-
tion is rarely required.
NORA is a semiquantitative tool, and thus, also the interpretation
of the results needs to be both verbal and numerical. Although there
are qualitative verbal definitions, the location within the numerical
class should be taken into account. The estimated risk might be
close to a limit between two classes and is therefore relatively sensi-
tive to small changes in input values.
The weights for different disease transmission routes and subfac-
tors of consequences were assigned by the research group. Weights
for the nine different pathways were ranked so that the pathways
with the same significance were given the same rank. One hundred
points were divided between the pathways according to their ranks.
This is a fairly subjective and robust method, even though based on
published literature. Therefore, when assessing a new disease, these
weights should be assessed with the help of disease-specific experts.
The weighting for the subfactors for consequences was assigned
by giving FMD the highest score (100) and then scaling down the
other three diseases (BT, ASF and Schmallenberg) to correspond to
the estimated mean expenses of the disease epidemic. Therefore,
weights for consequence factors are related to the financial losses of
the epidemics and are not as subjective as weights for pathways.
NORA is a rapid tool to use, which makes it easy to run it again
whenever new information becomes available on a changing situa-
tion concerning disease spread. However, using experts in animal
health risk assessments in Finland can be problematic, because the
number and availability of experts is low. The results demonstrate
that depending on the experts used, a few well-picked experts are
sufficient to obtain a reasonable result. A small meeting or a sum-
mary with an update on the disease status and the situation at hand
may be enough before the assessment. For example, in the case of
new evidence of illegal imports of pigs or pork from the infected
areas, updating the assessment with NORA would be useful.
We will continue using NORA also for other diseases and scenar-
ios. Each disease needs to be validated within the research group
and a group of disease-specific experts. ASF can act as a benchmark
and form a basis on which to derive probabilities of entry and expo-
sure for other diseases.
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